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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Leann Faye Smith appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon her

guilty plea to

possession ofheroin. Speciﬁcally, Smith challenges the district court’s conclusion that she waived
her right to ﬁle a motion t0 Withdraw her guilty plea, and the district court’s sentencing
determination.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

Proceedings

A Coeur d’Alene police ofﬁcer made contact With Smith and another individual Who were
parked in a

WinCo

parking

lot.

(R., p.17.)

After ﬁnding Smith’s answers to several questions to

be suspicious, ofﬁcers conducted a consensual search 0f the other individual’s person.

(Id.)

After

recovering a syringe from the other individual’s pocket, and after obtaining admissions from that
individual about his heroin use, ofﬁcers searched the vehicle.

(R., pp.17-18.)

The ofﬁcers

recovered heroin and drug paraphernalia in the course of that search. (R., p.18.) Smith admitted

ownership 0f the containers in Which the contraband was found.

(Id.)

The

state

charged Smith

with possession 0f heroin and drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.69-70.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Smith entered an Alford plea to the heroin possession charge

and the

state

agreed t0 dismiss the drug paraphernalia charge. (2/12/19

State’s Exhibit 1.)

ﬁxed. {2/12/19

The

Tr.,

state also

Tr., p. 11,

L.6 — p.30, L. 10;

agreed to recommend a uniﬁed four—year sentence With two years

p.11, Ls.23-25.)

Smith agreed “t0 waive appeal as a right

t0 the conviction,

as well as her ability t0

Exhibit

withdraw the guilty plea.” (2/12/19

Tr.,

p.11, Ls.17-21;

ﬂ alﬂ

State’s

1.)

Prior t0 sentencing, despite her waiver, Smith ﬁled a motion to Withdraw her guilty plea.

(R., pp.84-85.)

The motion was supported by a sworn afﬁdavit

other things, that she

was unable

proceeding, that she did not

to effectively

in

which Smith

alleged,

among

communicate With her attorney throughout the

remember being informed of

certain terms of the plea agreement

before the change of plea hearing, that she did not understand the proceedings or the conditions of
the plea agreement, and that she agreed t0 accept the state’s plea offer even though she “felt in

[her] heart

At

it

was

the

wrong thing

the subsequent hearing

intelligently, 0r voluntarily

motion.

t0 d0.” (R., pp.86-89.)

(4/29/19

Tr.,

on the motion, Smith argued

made. (4/29/19

p.44, L.13.)

The

Tr.,

state

p.41, L.6

—

that her plea

was not knowingly,

L20.) The

state objected to the

p.43,

submitted into evidence an audio recording of the

change of plea hearing and noted that Smith’s calm demeanor and the
plea colloquy demonstrated that Smith’s plea

was

district court’s

thorough

voluntary. (4/29/19 Tr., p.44, Ls.13-23; State’s

Exhibit 2.) The district court denied Smith’s motion. (4/29/19

Tr.,

p.52, L.10

—

p.54, L.15.)

The

court found that Smith knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to request that her guilty plea

be Withdrawn; and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into the plea agreement.
(4/29/19

Tr.,

p.53, L.11

— p.54,

After both parties

— p.77, L3;

L.15.)

recommended that Smith be placed 0n probation

p.78, Ls.4-12), the district court

(8/ 12/ 1 9 Tr., p.76,

L.24

imposed a uniﬁed four-year sentence With two years

ﬁxed, suspended the sentence, and placed Smith on probation for two years
8/12/19

Tr.,

p.81, Ls.16-20). Smith timely appealed. (R., pp. 115-118.)

(R.,

pp.103-107;

ISSUES
Smith

states the issues

on appeal

as:

Are Ms. Smith’s waivers of her right t0 appeal and her right t0 ﬁle a motion

I.

to

withdraw the plea invalid and unenforceable, because her plea was not

knowing,

Did the

II.

t0

intelligent,

district court

and voluntary?

abuse

its

discretion

When it denied Ms.

Smith’s motion

Withdraw her guilty plea, because her plea was not knowing,

intelligent,

and voluntary?

Did the

III.

district court

abuse

its

discretion

when it imposed a uniﬁed sentence

0f four years, with two years ﬁxed, upon Ms. Smith following her plea of
guilty to possession of a controlled substance?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Does

the record demonstrate that Smith’s waivers of her right to appeal her conviction and

right to ﬁle a

voluntary?

motion

to

Withdraw her guilty plea were both knowing,

In the alternative, has Smith failed to

show

that the district court

discretion in additionally denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea

2.

Has Smith

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

intelligent,

0n

its

and

abused
merits?

sentencing discretion?

its

ARGUMENT
I.

The Record Demonstrates That Smith’s Waivers Of Her Right To Appeal Her Conviction And
Her Right To

A.

File

A Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Were Knowing, Intelligent, And

My

Introduction

Smith contends
to ﬁle a

motion

motion on

its

to

that the district court erred in concluding that she validly

withdraw her guilty plea; and then abused

merits.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-15.)

the record reveals that her guilty plea and

fail

accompanying waivers of her
all

by

right

also denying the

because a review of
rights t0 appeal her

entered voluntarily, knowingly,

intelligently.

Guilty Plea

Of Her Right To Appeal And Right To
Were Validlv Entered

Defendants

may waive their right to

Smith’s Waivers

B.

it

was

voluntarily, knowingly,

and

File

A Motion To Withdraw Her

appeal as a term of a plea agreement. State

153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2012). Such a waiver
that

discretion

Smith’s contentions

conviction and to ﬁle a motion t0 Withdraw her guilty plea were

and

its

waived her

intelligently

is

made. State

V.

V.

Straub,

enforceable if the record shows

Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 129

P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006). Appellate courts employ the same analysis used to determine the validity

0f any guilty plea when evaluating the enforceability 0f a waiver 0f the right to appeal provided as
part of a plea agreement. State V.

Mugphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994).

When the validity of a guilty plea is
independent review of the record. State

V.

challenged on appeal, the appellate court conducts an

Hawkins, 115 Idaho 719, 720, 769 P.2d 596, 597

(Ct.

App. 1989).

Whether a plea

is

voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1)

Whether the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the nature 0f the charges

and was not coerced;
jury

(2)

Whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right t0 a

to confront accusers,

trial,

and

to refrain

from self—incrimination; and

defendant understood the consequences of pleading
P.2d 626, 628 (1976). If the evidence

is

guilty.

(3)

whether the

State V. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34,

557

conﬂicting as t0 the circumstances surrounding the guilty

plea, the appellate court will accept the trial court’s

ﬁndings of

fact supported

by

substantial

evidence. Hawkins, 115 Idaho at 720-721, 769 P.2d at 597-598. However, the Court Will freely

review the

trial

769 P.2d

598

at

court’s application of constitutional requirements t0 the facts found.

As Smith

Q

at

721,

notes 0n appeal (Appellant’s brief, p.10), there does not appear to be any

published Idaho case on the standard for appellate review 0f a

district court’s application

defendant’s waiver of the right t0 ﬁle a motion t0 withdraw a guilty plea.

The

state agrees

of a
with

Smith’s submission 0n appeal that the above standards for determining the validity 0f a guilty plea,
or appellate waiver associated With a guilty plea, should also apply to a waiver of the right to ﬁle

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

At
with the

the change of plea hearing, Smith’s counsel represented that Smith’s plea agreement

state

included a term that Smith agreed to “waive appeal as a right t0 the conviction, as

well as her ability to withdraw the guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule

Tr.,

The written plea

p.11, Ls.11-21.)

representation. (State’s Exhibit

1.)

offer prepared

by

the state

was

34W”

(2/12/19

consistent with this

A review of the record demonstrates that Smith’s guilty plea,

appellate waiver, and waiver of her right to ﬁle a motion to withdraw her guilty plea

were

all

entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and were thus valid.

The

district court

engaged

pleas and the accompanying waivers.

right t0 ﬁle a

motion

Smith conﬁrmed
ready to plead

to

guilty.

had enough time

Tr.,

p.13, Ls.10-16.)

to consult with her

{2/12/19 Tn, p.12, L.21

—

p.13, L.2.)

lawyer and

When

(2/12/19 TL, p.25, L.7

follow-up questions to which Smith responded

enough

for her t0 understand

that:

what she was doing

—

felt

In this colloquy,

comfortable and

Smith acknowledged

“sometimes” had trouble communicating With her lawyer, the court
questioning t0 address that response.

t0 accepting Smith’s

The colloquy speciﬁcally referenced Smith’s waiver 0f her

Withdraw her guilty plea. (2/12/19

that she

Smith prior

in a thorough colloquy With

that she

initiated a more-detailed

p.26, L.8.)

This included ﬁve

her communication with counsel was good

that day; she did not

need any more time With

her counsel to work out any communication issues; despite the indication that she had some

communications issues

at

some

point, she

still

did ultimately understand what counsel

was saying

1

Smith subsequently ﬁled a motion t0 Withdraw her guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 34. (R., pp.8485.) At the hearing on the motion, Smith informed the court that her motion was “more appropriate
under Idaho Rule 33(0).” (4/29/19 Tn, p.40, Ls.5-8.) It appears that the parties’ reference t0 I.C.R.
34 was initiated by a typo 0n the state’s amended pretrial settlement order. (State’s Exhibit 1;
alﬂ 4/29/19 Tn, p.51, L.20 — p.52, L.3; p.53, Ls.6-10.) Smith has not argued below or on appeal
that these references to I.C.R. 34 rendered her subsequent I.C.R. 33(0) motion to be outside the
scope 0f her waiver.
generally Appellant’s brief; 4/29/ 19 Tr.)

ﬂ

(ﬂ

to her;

and

that

any questions she had were answered by her counsel.

the court that she

was not “emotionally

stressed” to the point that

think clearly, and that she believed her plea
p.27, Ls.8-1

come back

1;

was

affecting her ability t0

“freely and voluntarily.” (2/ 12/ 1 9 Tn,

p.28, Ls. 10-12.) Finally, the court explained to Smith that “[s]ometimes people will

to [c]0urt

and ask

t0

Withdraw

plea agreement in “despair” caused

18.)

was being made

it

Smith also informed

(Id.)

Smith responded
In the hearing

that this

their guilty plea,”

was not

assert that they only entered the

bad performance. (2/12/19 TL, p.29, Ls.7—

their counsel’s

by

and

the case with her. (2/12/19 Tr., p.29, Ls.16-19.)

on Smith’s subsequent motion

t0

Withdraw her guilty plea, the

referenced this thorough colloquy and Smith’s responses. (4/29/19

Tr.,

district court

An

p.39, Ls.7-16.)

audio

recording of the relevant portion of the change of plea hearing was entered into evidence and

published to the court

at the hearing,

giving the court the opportunity to review the manner in

Which Smith answered the questions posed
Exhibit 2.) The court

bound by

made

little

this

weight in

its

the

at the

determination. (4/29/19

ﬁnding because

it is

Tr.,

same

p.44, L.13

—

district court

p.46, L.24; State’s

judge

a speciﬁc ﬁnding that the assertions

Which contradicted her statements made

and carried

(4/29/19

— which was presided over by

over the change of plea hearing — then
afﬁdavit,

t0 her.

who

made

presided

in Smith’s

change 0f plea hearing, were not credible

Tr.,

p.53, L.17

—

p.54, L.1.) This Court

is

supported by the substantial evidence contained in the audio

recording ofthe change ofplea hearing.

E

Hawkins, 115 Idaho

at

720-721, 769 P.2d

at

597-598.

Further, a review of the afﬁdavit itself (R., pp.86-89), reveals that several of the assertions

contained therein, including Smith’s explanation for

Why

she missed a court hearing, and her

assertion that she “felt in [her] heart” that entering the plea

“was the wrong thing

to d0,”

do not

speak t0 the voluntariness of the plea and Smith’s waivers.

Because the record demonstrates
right t0 ﬁle a

entered,

motion

motion

Smith has

to

and accompanying waiver of her

withdraw her guilty plea were knowingly, voluntarily, and

t0

failed t0

withdraw her

that Smith’s guilty plea

show

plea.

that the district court erred in applying this valid

In the alternative, for

all

of the same reasons,

this

intelligently

waiver t0 her

Court should not

consider this claim due t0 Smith’s validly-entered waiver 0f her appellate rights?

C.

Alternatively,

The

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

Smith’s Motion T0 Withdraw Her Guilty Plea Also Failed
In addition to concluding that Smith

plea, the district court also

When
plea

is

before sentence

district court

is

imposed.

not an automatic right, however.

281, 284 (1990); State

V.

The

state

abused

its

its

merits. (4/29/ 19 Tr., p.54, Ls.8—

discretion.

I.C.R. 33(0).

The presentence withdrawal 0f a

State V. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298,

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780

defendant bears the burden of proving, in the

2

Merits

the right to ﬁle such a motion has not been waived, a motion to withdraw a guilty

may be made

guilty plea

Its

waived her right to ﬁle a motion t0 withdraw her guilty

concluded that the motion failed 0n

Smith has failed to show that the

15.)

Discretion To Conclude That

On

district court, that the

(Ct.

787 P.2d

App. 2008). The

plea should be Withdrawn.

submits that an appeal waiver bars appeals from the denial 0f a motion to withdraw a

E

McGuire, 796 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2015); United States V.
However, the state acknowledges that the
Idaho Court oprpeals has previously held that an appeal waiver does not bar an appeal that, if
State V. Allen, 143
decided in the appellant’s favor, would render the waiver unenforceable.
Idaho 267, 270, 141 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006).
guilty plea.

United States

V.

Salas—Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012).

E

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho
94, 97-98 (Ct.

at 535,

211 P.3d

at

780; Grifﬁth

App. 1992). In ruling on a motion

t0

V. State,

121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825 P.2d

Withdraw a guilty plea, the

determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea

district court

was entered knowingly,

must

intelligently

and

voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State V. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959,

801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990).

and voluntary

if

it is

“entered

value 0f any commitments

United

States,

by one

made

to

As

a matter of constitutional due process, a plea

is

knowing

aware of the direct consequences, including the actual

fully

him by

own

the court, prosecutor, 0r his

counsel.” Brady

V.

397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).

If the plea

was voluntary,

in the constitutional sense, then the court

must determine Whether

other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536,

211 P.3d
his

at 781.

The good

faith, credibility,

and weight of the defendant’s assertions

motion to Withdraw his plea are matters for the

trial

court t0 decide.

I_d.

“Appellate review of the denial of a motion t0 withdraw a plea

district

court

is

at

in support

0f

537, 211 P.3d at 782.

limited to whether the

exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.”

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho

at

535-536, 211 P.3d

at

780-781 (citing State

V.

McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,

362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)).
In this case, Smith has not argued

district court

0n appeal

that

justiﬁed the Withdrawal 0f her guilty plea.

Smith asserted only that her plea was not knowingly,
For the reasons

set forth above, a

any “other just cause” presented

(E Appellant’s

intelligently,

review of the record contradicts

10

brief, p.12.)

Instead,

and voluntarily entered.

this assertion.

t0 the

(Id.)

Therefore, even

ifher waivers did not bar her attempt t0 withdraw her plea, Smith has failed to
court abused

its

discretion in additionally denying the motion

0n

its

show that the district

merits.

II.

Smith Has Failed To Show That The
A.

District Court

Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Smith contends

abused

that the district court

its

discretion

by imposing an excessive

sentence for heroin possession.3 (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-18.) However, Smith cannot

entitled to relief

is

because she has failed t0 establish that the

four-year sentence with

two years ﬁxed

for heroin possession

obj ectives of sentencing, Smith’s extensive criminal history,

Standard

B.

district court’s

show she

suspended uniﬁed

was excessive considering

and other factors before the

the

court.

Of Review

When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court Will review only for an abuse
0f discretion. State

V.

Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court abused

The

C.

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

3

under any reasonable View of the

Smith waived her appellate

Exhibit

1.)

Therefore,

it

discretion. Li.

Sentencing Discretion

To bear the burden 0f demonstrating an abuse 0f
that,

its

The appellant has

facts, the

sentence

discretion, the appellant

is

rights “as to the conviction.”

excessive.

Li To

must

establish

establish that her

(2/12/19 Tn, p.11, Ls.16-18; State’s
appears that Smith’s challenge t0 the district court’s sentencing

determination in outside the scope of that waiver.

11

excessive, Smith

sentence

is

sentence

was appropriate

rehabilitation,

(Ct.

V.

its

that reasonable

minds could not conclude the

accomplish the sentencing goals 0f protecting society, deterrence,

to

and retribution. Li;

App. 1982)

court abused

must demonstrate

ﬂ

also State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,

(setting forth these sentencing obj actives).

650 P.2d 707, 710

“When considering whether the district

m

sentencing discretion, [the appellate courts] review the entire sentence[.]”

Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citation omitted). However, the

appellate court will “presume that the defendant’s term of conﬁnement will probably be the

ﬁxed

portion of the sentence, because whether 0r not the defendant’s incarceration extends beyond the

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

Will be within the sole discretion of the parole board.”

Li

(citation

omitted).

In this case, prior t0 imposing

factors. (8/ 12/ 1 9 TL, p.79, Ls.7-20.)

its

sentence, the district court cited the relevant sentencing

The court then referenced Smith’s extensive criminal history,

but ultimately decided t0 follow the state’s sentencing recommendation despite
the

recommendation was “a lenient one” under the circumstances.

As

its

observation that

(8/ 12/ 1 9 p.80, L.3

— p.8 1

the district court correctly observed, Smith has an extensive criminal history.

,

L. 1 5.)

Since

1997, Smith has approximately 12 felony criminal convictions, mostly involving fraud-related

crimes committed in Washington. (PSI, pp. 1 1-18.) Smith also has approximately 11 misdemeanor
convictions for crimes including domestic Violence, theft, and trespass. (1d,) Smith’s PSI further
indicates

numerous probation

Violations. (Id.)

12

Despite this criminal history and previous failures on probation, the district court followed
the state’s

state’s

recommendation t0 place Smith 0n probation again.4 (8/12/19

T11,

p.8 1 Ls. 12-20.)
,

recommendation 0f a suspended uniﬁed four-year sentence With two years ﬁxed

conviction on a charge which carried a

maximum

The

(for a

sentence of seven years incarceration, LC. § 37-

2732(c)( 1 )), was different from Smith’s sentencing recommendation only in that the

latter

included

one fewer suspended ﬁxed term 0f incarceration and one fewer indeterminate year (8/12/19 TL,
p.78, Ls.5-12).

Smith has

incarceration (one ﬁxed,

failed to demonstrate that these additional

two suspended years of

one indeterminate), rendered the sentence excessive, particularly

considering her extensive criminal record.

On appeal,

Smith argues

that in

imposing

its

sentence, the district court did not adequately

consider mitigating factors including Smith’s mental health and substance abuse issues, her

documented

efforts t0 treat these conditions, her history

and her positive contributions

perpetrated

by her

pp.15-18.)

However, Smith has pointed

father,

t0

district court’s

t0 the

community.

(Appellant’s brief,

n0 portions of the record indicating

court failed t0 adequately consider these things, and there

The

of trauma including physical abuse

is

no such indication

that the district

in the record itself.

suspended uniﬁed four-year sentence with two years ﬁxed was entirely

reasonable considering the objectives 0f sentencing, Smith’s criminal history, and other factors

4

Though not reﬂected

motion

to

in the

amended written plea

Withdraw Smith’s guilty plea

(ﬂ

offer entered as

the state’s initial plea offer also included an agreement t0

was withdrawn

after

Smith failed

an exhibit

at the

hearing on the

State’s Exhibit 1), defense counsel represented that

recommend probation, but that this term

to appear at a court hearing.

(2/12/19

Tr.,

p.17, Ls.15-19.)

Nonetheless, the state recommended, at the sentencing hearing, that the court place Smith on
probation. (8/12/19, p.76, L.21

— p.77,

L.3.)
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before the court.

Smith has therefore

failed to demonstrate that the district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

upon Smith’s

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction entered

guilty plea to heroin possession.

DATED this

17th

day of July, 2020.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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